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Abstract
We construct a model where money is essential to examine the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries
in the propagation of aggregate shocks. We then derive the optimal stabilization response by the
central bank to these shocks where the central bank’s objective is to maximize the welfare of the
representative agent subject to a seigniorage constraint. We show that ﬁnancial intermediation
can lead to higher consumption volatility and that the optimal policy typically involves providing
an elastic supply of currency to smooth nominal interest rates.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Optimal monetary policy has a long and short-run component. The long-run component focuses on
what the optimal trend inﬂation rate or money growth rate should be. The short-run component
is concerned with the optimal stabilization response to economic shocks. The ‘science of monetary
policy’ requires constructing macroeconomic models to study these issues. What attributes should
such a model have? First, since the issue is optimal monetary policy, it seems obvious that money
should be essential for trade. Second, the model should be based on micro-foundations with opti-
mizing agents. Third, the monetary authority should choose policies that maximize the welfare of
the representative agent subject to the constraints of the economic environment.
How well does the current ‘science of monetary policy’ satisfy these three criteria? New Key-
nesian (NK) models come close to satisfying the second and third criteria. On the other hand, the
NK model fails miserably in terms of satisfying criteria one since they do not explicitly derive the
underlying frictions that give rise to money. Instead money is forced into the model, which gives
rise to the second drawback of the model. For monetary policy to have real eﬀects there must be
nominal price/wage rigidity but this rigidity is simply assumed to exist and is not derived from ﬁrst
principles. Thus, by having poor microfoundations for money in the models, ad hoc assumptions
about price and wage rigidity must be used for money to have real eﬀects. A more appealing
approach is to model explicitly the frictions that give rise to money. These frictions alone should
be suﬃcient to give monetary policy real eﬀects thus avoiding the need for assumptions on price
and wage rigidity.
In this paper we study optimal monetary policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model in which money is essential. The basic framework is the Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2004)
model of money and credit that builds on the standard Lagos-Wright (2004) model of money. We
introduce a variety of economic shocks to this economy and examine the optimal stabilization
response of the monetary authority for a given long run inﬂation rate target. The existence of the
credit sector generates a nominal interest rate that the monetary authority is able to manipulate
via changes in the aggregate money stock. The monetary authority’s objective is to maximize the
lifetime expected utility of the representative agent subject to being an equilibrium policy and
satisfying an exogenous seigniorage requirement. In the absence of any seigniorage requirement,
we show that the optimal long run policy is the Friedman rule (a zero nominal interest rate) and
stabilization policy is not needed. However, with binding seigniorage requirements that force the
2monetary authority away from the Friedman rule, stabilization policy has real, welfare improving
eﬀects. We show that stabilizing nominal interest rates is welfare improving for some shocks but
not others.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment. In Section 3 the
agents optimization problems are presented. Section 4 examines the equilibrium of the economy
and the impact of each shock on the allocation. Section 5 contains the optimal stabilization policies
of the central bank. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
Time is discrete and in each period there are two markets that open sequentially and are perfectly
competitive.1 There is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents and one perishable good produced
and consumed by all agents.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst market agents get a preference shock such that they either can
consume or produce. With probability n an agent can consume but cannot produce while with
probability 1−n the agent can produce but cannot consume. We refer to consumers as buyers and
producers as sellers. Agents get utility εu(q) from q>0 consumption in the ﬁrst market, where ε
is a preference parameter and u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +∞,a n du0(∞)=0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,w e
impose that the elasticity of utility e(q)=
qu0(q)
u(q) is bounded. Producers incur utility cost c(q)=q/a
from producing q units of output where a is a measure of productivity. To motivate a role for ﬁat
money, we assume that all goods trades are anonymous. In particular, trading histories of agents
are private information. Consequently, sellers require immediate compensation so buyers pay with
money. There is also no public communication of individual trading outcomes (public memory),
which eliminates the use of trigger strategies to support gift-giving equilibria.
The parameters n, a and ε are stochastic. The random variable n has support [n,n] ∈ (0,1), a
has support [a,a], ∞ > a>a> 0,a n dε has support [ε,ε], ∞ > ε>ε> 0.L e tω =( n,a,ε) ∈ Ω
be the aggregate state in market 1, where Ω =[ n,n]× [a,a] × [ε,ε] is a closed and compact
subset on R3
+.L e tf (ω) denote the density function of ω.T h es h o c k sf o l l o wﬁrst order stationary
Markov processes with the stationary transition matrix Π. The stationary conditional density
function is denoted by f (ω|ω−1). Denote the unconditional expectations E (n)=ˆ n, E(1/a)=1
1The basic environment is that of Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2004) which is a combination of Lagos and
Wright (2003) and Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2003).
3and E (ε)=1 . Since shocks to n aﬀect the ratio of sellers to buyers it can be interpreted as an
extensive margin aggregate demand shock with high values of n corresponding to many buyers and
high demand for goods.2 Aggregate shocks to ε are intensive margin aggregate demand shocks.
Shocks to a are aggregate productivity shocks. If the shocks are independent, then f (ω|ω−1)=
f (n,n−1)f (a,a−1)f (ε,ε−1).
In the second market all agents consume and produce, getting utility U(x) from x consumption,
with U0(x) > 0, U0(0) = ∞, U0(+∞)=0and U00(x) ≤ 0.3 Agents can produce one unit of x with
one unit of labor h. Production of x units of output generates disutility h. The discount factor
across dates is β ∈ (0,1). There is no uncertainty in market 2. Adding uncertainty to this market
is not interesting because monetary policy will have no eﬀects on real variables in this market since
it is a completely frictionless market.
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of ﬁat currency. The growth rate of
the money stock is given by Mt = γMt−1 where γ>0 and Mt denotes the per capita money stock
in market 2 in period t. For notational ease variables corresponding to the next period are indexed
by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period are indexed by −1. Agents receive lump
sum transfers τM−1 =( γ − 1)M−1 over the period t.I f τ<0, we assume the central bank has
the authority to levy taxes in the form of currency to extract cash from the economy. Some of the
transfer is received at the beginning of market 1 and some during market 2. Let τ1M−1 and τ2M−1
denote the transfers in market 1 and 2 in state ω ∈ Ω respectively with (τ1 + τ2)M−1 = τM−1.
Thus, since there is randomness in the economy, the central bank may choose to make the timing
of the injections contingent on the aggregate state of the economy. Note that the growth rate of
the money supply is still deterministic.4 If the timing of the transfers is not state contingent, we
say that policy is passive. Otherwise it is active.
As in BCW (2004) there are banks that have a record-keeping technology over ﬁnancial trans-
2When the measures of buyers and sellers are random the aggregate demand for goods is also random and changes
on the extensive margin. Although the measure of sellers is random, with linear production costs equilibrium output
is entirely demand determined. By varying the number of sellers we also change the amount of idle cash balances in
the economy. When banks intermediate deposits, this implies deposits and loans will be random. This suggests that
banks may amplify shocks to the economy. We show below that although banks increase consumption in all states
they also create more consumption volatility for individual agents.
3Following Lagos-Wright (2003), the diﬀerence in preferences over the good sold in the last market allows us to
impose technical conditions such that the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of a period.
4Lucas (1990) employs a similar process for the money supply to so that changes in nominal interest rates result
purely from allocative shocks and not changes in expected inﬂation. The same holds true in our model.
4actions that allows them to take deposits and make loans. In the ﬁrst market the banking sector
opens before trading and agents can borrow and deposit after observing the shocks. Then, buyers
and sellers trade. In the second market the goods market and the banking sector opens simulta-
neously. We assume net settlements, i.e. all ﬁnancial claims are settled at the end of the period.
This essentially means that loans and deposits cannot be rolled over. Consequently, all ﬁnancial
contracts are one-period contracts. In all models with credit repayment is a serious issue. However,
since we focus on stabilization issues, we assume repayment can be enforced on all loans.
Banks accept nominal deposits and pay the nominal interest rate id and make nominal loans
at nominal rate i. The banking sector is perfectly competitive, so banks take these rates as given.
There are no operating costs so the zero proﬁt condition implies that id = i.
It is straightforward to show that in a symmetric equilibrium in state ω all borrowers take out





where µ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a banking system exists and 0 otherwise. We
introduce µ in order to compare the allocations when banks exist and when they do not.
The precise sequence of action after agents observe the shocks is as follows. First, the monetary
injection τ1M−1 occurs. Second, sellers deposit their excess cash and buyers borrow money from
the banking sector. Thus, monetary policy can inﬂuence market interest rates without doing open
market operations — it simply injects money and lets the private sector reallocate the cash thereby
causing interest rates to change. Finally, agents move on to the goods market and trade. In the
second market the injection τ2M−1 occurs and the goods market and banking sector open where
all ﬁnancial claims are settled.
3 Agents’ Choices and Value functions
In period t,l e tφ = φ(ω) be the real price of money in the second market given state ω occurred
in market 1. We study equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are time-invariant
φM = φ−1M−1 = z. (2)
We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium.
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V (m1,ω−1) denote the expected value from trading in
market 1 with m1 money balances conditional on the aggregate shock ω−1.L e tW (m2,l,d) denote
5the expected value from entering the second market with m2 units of money, l loans, and d deposits
when the aggregate state is ω. Note that all quantities and prices are functions of the aggregate
state ω,i . e . ,m2 = m2 (ω), l = l(ω),a n dd = d(ω). We suppress this dependence for notational
simplicity. In what follows, we look at a representative period t and work backwards from the
second to the ﬁrst market to examine the agents’ choices.
3.1 The second market
In the second market agents trade good x and adjust their money balances taking into account cash
payments or receipts from the bank. Loans are repaid by borrowers and bank redeem deposits. If
an agent has borrowed l units of money, then he pays (1 + i)l units of money. If he has deposited
d units of money, he receives (1 + i)d. The representative agent’s program is
W (m2,l,d)= m a x
x,h,m1,+1
[U (x) − h + βV (m1,+1,ω)] (3)
s.t. x + φm1,+1 = h + φ(m2 + τ2M−1)+φ(1 + i)d − φ(1 + i)l
where m1,+1 is the money taken into period t+1, l is nominal borrowing, and d is nominal deposits
in the ﬁrst market.
Rewriting the budget constraint in terms of h and substituting into (3) yields
W (m2,l,d)=φ[m2 + τ2M−1 − (1 + i)l +( 1+i)d]
+m a x
x,m1,+1
[U (x) − x − φm1,+1 + βV (m1,+1,ω)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions are U0 (x)=1and
−φ−1 + βV 0(m1,ω−1)=0 (4)
where the ﬁrst-order condition for money has been lagged one period. Thus, V 0(m1,ω−1) is the
marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the ﬁr s tm a r k e to p e ni np e r i o dt,a n d
φ−1 is the real price of money in the second market of period t − 1 measured in units of utility.
The envelope conditions are
Wm = φ (5)
Wd = −Wl = φ(1 + i). (6)
If no banking system exists then Wd = Wl =0 . As in Lagos-Wright (2004) the value function is
linear in wealth. The implication is that all agents enter the following period with the same amount
of money.
63.2 The ﬁrst market
Let qb and qs respectively denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller
trading in market 1.L e t p be the nominal price of goods in market 1. It is straightforward to
show that buyers will never deposit funds in the bank and sellers will never take out loans. Thus,
ls = db =0 . In what follows we let l denote loans taken out by buyers and d deposits of sellers. We
also drop these arguments in W(m,l,d) where relevant for notational simplicity.





{n[εu(qb)+W (m1 + τ1M−1 + l − pqb,l)]
+(1− n)[−qs/a + W (m1 + τ1M−1 − d + pqs,d)]}f (ω|ω−1)dω
(7)
where pqb is the amount of money spent as a buyer, and pqs the money received as a seller.
After the shocks are realized, agents become either a buyer or a seller.
Sellers’ decisions It is straightforward to show that it is optimal for sellers to deposit all their
money balances if i>0.I fi =0 , they are indiﬀerent since they earn no money. In what follows we
assume that if i =0 ,t h e nd =0 . This assumption has no implication for the equilibrium allocation





= m1 + τ1M−1 if i>0
=0 otherwise
, ω ∈ Ω (8)
A seller’s problem is
max
qs
[−qs/a + W (pqs,d)]
Using (5), the ﬁrst order conditions reduce to
1=apφ, ω ∈ Ω. (9)
Since sellers have linear costs in both markets they are indiﬀerent how much they produce in market
1 given (9) holds. In what follows we assume that all sellers produce the same quantities. Note
that sellers cannot deposit receipts of cash obtain from selling output.
Buyers’ decisions If an agent is a buyer in the ﬁrst market, his problem is:
max
qb,l
[εu(qb)+W (m1 + τ1M−1 + l − pqb,l)]
s.t. pqb ≤ m1 + τ1M−1 + l
7Notice that buyers can spend more cash than what they bring into the ﬁrst market since they can
borrow cash to supplement their money holdings at the cost of the nominal interest rate. Using
(5) the buyer’s ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as
u0 (qb) − pφ − pλ =0 ,ω ∈ Ω (10)
−iφ + λ =0 ,ω ∈ Ω (11)
λ[m1 + τ1M−1 + l − pqb]=0 ,ω ∈ Ω (12)
where λ = λ(ω) are the multipliers of the buyer’s cash constraints for all states ω ∈ Ω.
Deﬁne the set of states where the constraint is nonbinding as Ω0 = {ω ∈ Ω|λ(ω)=0}.A c -
cordingly, deﬁne Ω1 = {ω ∈ Ω|λ(ω) > 0}. Then, if the constraint is not binding, by using (5), (10)
reduces to
aεu0 (qb)=1 ,ω ∈ Ω0. (13)
Hence trades are eﬃcient.5 In what follows deﬁne the solution of (13) as q∗ = q∗ (ω).F r o m( 1 1 )i t
is evident that if λ =0the interest rate in a monetary equilibrium satisﬁes i =0 .
If the constraint is binding, then equations (9), (10) and (11) imply
aεu0 (qb)=1+i, ω ∈ Ω1. (14)
Since from (11) i>0,w eh a v eaεu0 (qb) > 1 which means trades are ineﬃcient. The buyer spends
a l lo fh i sm o n e y ,pqb = m1 + τ1M−1 + l, and consumes qb =
m1+τ1M−1+l
p .





nεu0 (qb)/p +( 1− n)φ(1 + µi)
ª
f (ω|ω−1)dω
In the appendix we show that the value function is concave in m.






naεu0 (qb)+( 1− n)(1+µi)
ª
f (ω|ω−1)dω. (15)
Note that banks increase the marginal value of money because sellers can deposit idle cash and earn
interest as opposed to the non-bank case. This is captured by the second term on the right-hand
side. In the non-bank case (µ =0 ) this term is just 1 − n.
5With n buyers and 1 − n sellers, the planner maximizes nu(qb) − (1 − n)c(qs) s.t. nqb =( 1− n)qs.U s e t h e








qs,ω ∈ Ω. (16)
Note that by symmetry we impose that all sellers produce the same quantity qs even though they
are indiﬀerent regarding how much to produce when (9) holds.






1+[ n +( 1− n)µ]
£
aεu0 (qb) − 1
¤ª
f (ω|ω−1)dω.







φ(ω)[n +( 1− n)µ]
£
aεu0 (aυθz (ω)) − 1
¤
f (ω|ω−1)dω.









where θ =1−µ+µ/n and υ =( 1+τ1)/(1 + τ).6 Consequently, we have qb = φaυθM = aυθz (ω)
if ω ∈ Ω1,w h e r ez = z (ω) is the real stock of money in state ω.







z (ω)[n +( 1− n)µ]
£
aεu0 (aυθz (ω)) − 1
¤
f (ω|ω−1)dω.
Since we study equilibria where the end-of-period real money balances are time invariant we can






z (ω)f (ω|ω−1)dω +
Z
Ω1
z (ω)[n +( 1− n)µ]
£




Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric monetary steady-state equilibrium is a function z(ω) that satisﬁes (17).
(17) is a functional equation in z(.). If the states are not serially correlated, i.e. if they are i.i.d,
then the right-hand side of (17) is independent of ω−1. Consequently, the real stock of money is a
constant. If the states are serially correlated, the real stock of money is a function of the state.
We now analyze the optimal response to these shocks when the shocks are serially correlated
a n dw h e nt h e ya r en o t .W eb e g i nw i t ht h es e c o n dc a s e .
6Note that θ =1if there are no banks and θ =1 /n with banks.
94 Optimal policy without persistence
Before we derive the optimal response to these shocks, we now analyze each shock separately to
understand how each one aﬀects the allocation.






[n +( 1− n)µ]
£
aεu0 (aυθz) − 1
¤
f (ω)dω. (18)
4.1 Extensive margin demand shocks
For the analysis of shocks to n,w es e t1/a = E (1/a)=1and ε = E (ε)=1 . It then follows that
ω = n. Note that the optimal quantities solve q∗ = u0−1 (1).
Proposition 1 For γ ≥ β, a monetary equilibrium exists with q = q∗ for all n at γ = β.F o r
γ>β , the equilibrium is unique with q = q∗ if n ≤ ˜ n and q<q ∗ if n>˜ n,w h e r e˜ n ∈ (n
¯
,¯ n).
Moreover, d˜ n/dγ < 0.
The Friedman rule replicates the ﬁrst-best allocation. At the Friedman rule agents can self-
insure at no cost so there is no role for stabilization policies.7 Away from the Friedman rule, buyers
are constrained when there are many borrowers (high n) but are not constrained when there are
many depositors (low n). Since d˜ n/dγ < 0, the higher is the trend inﬂation rate, the larger is the
range of shocks where the quantity traded is ineﬃciently low.
We want to compare the equilibrium outcome in the banking economy to the no-banking case
when these shocks occur. For this purpose we eliminate for now policy responses to these shocks by
setting τ1 (n)=τ implying υ(n)=1for all n. We can replicate the no-banking equilibrium simply
by setting µ =0which implies θ =1 . The quantities consumed in the no-banking equilibrium are








u0 (z) − 1
¤
dF (n)
Hence, in the no banking equilibrium, buyers consume the same quantity across states since they
can only spend the cash they bring into market 1 which is independent of the state that is realized.8
In contrast, when banks exist, idle cash from sellers is deposited and lent back out to buyers. This
expands borrowing and leads to higher quantities of goods consumed by buyers. If n>˜ n, then
7This is very similar to the result found by Ireland (1996). He shows that even with nominal price stickiness, there
is no need to stabilize aggregate demand shocks at the Friedman rule.
8Note however that aggregate consumption in the economy is increasing in n.
10increasing n means there are more buyers and fewer deposits to lend out. This drives up nominal
interest rates, which decreases consumption. Thus, individual consumption is high in low demand
states and low in high demand states.
Corollary 1 Without banks dq/dn =0 . With banks we have dq/dn = −q/n ≤ 0 for n>˜ n and
dq/dn =0for n ≤ ˜ n.
The interesting aspect of this result is that while ﬁnancial intermediation raises average con-
sumption across states, is also causes interest rates to ﬂuctuate thereby making individual con-
sumption more volatile. To see this note that the nominal interest rate is i =0for n ≤ ˜ n and







Note that the expected nominal interest rate is increasing in γ since d˜ n/dγ < 0.
4.2 Intensive margin demand shocks
To study ε shocks we set a =1and n =ˆ n. It then follows that ω = ε. Note that in this case the
optimal quantities solve q∗ (ε)=u0−1 (1/ε).
Proposition 2 For γ ≥ β, a monetary equilibrium exists with q = q∗ (ε) for all ε at γ = β.F o r
γ>βthe equilibrium is unique with q<q ∗ (ε) for ε>˜ ε and q = q∗ (ε) for ε<˜ ε.
Once again the Friedman rule replicates the ﬁrst-best allocation. At the Friedman rule there
is no role for stabilization. Away from the Friedman rule, buyers are constrained in high marginal
utility states but not in low states.
Corollary 2 W i t hap a s s i v em o n e t a r yp o l i c ydq/dε =0for ε>˜ ε and dq/dε > 0 for ε ≤ ˜ ε.
This Corollary follows from the fact that when buyers are constrained (ε>˜ ε) q(ε)=θz which
does not depend on ε. Thus, even though buyers have a high marginal utility for consumption and
would like to buy more goods at the prevailing market price, they cannot. The reason is that their
holdings of money balances are unchanged and the market price is not a function of ε.T h u s ,f r o m
(14) the excess demand for goods simply leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate on loans
9For n<˜ n, buyers have more real balances than they need to buy the eﬃcient quantity. However, since i =0in
these states, there is no gain from depositing the excess cash balances in the bank.
11such that agents are able to buy the same quantity of goods. For ε ≤ ˜ ε, buyers have more than
enough real balances to buy the eﬃcient quantity. So when ε increases, they simply spend more of
their money balances.
4.3 Aggregate productivity shocks
To study aggregate productivity shocks, we set ε =1and n =ˆ n.I tt h e nf o l l o w st h a tω = a.N o t e
that in this case the optimal quantities are q∗ (a)=u0−1 (1/a).D e n o t eR(q)=−qu00 (q)/u0 (q).
Proposition 3 For γ ≥ β, a monetary equilibrium exists with q = q∗ (a) for all a at γ = β.F o r
γ>βthe equilibrium is unique. If R(q) ≥ 1,t h e nq<q ∗ (a) for a>˜ a and q = q∗ (a) for a<˜ a.
If R(q) < 1,t h e nq = q∗ (a) for a ≥ ˜ a and q<q ∗ (a) for a<˜ a.
As productivity increases, the marginal costs of producing fall which increases the eﬃcient
quantity. It also implies that prices fall. The issue is whether prices fall suﬃciently far to raise real
balances, az, enough to buy the higher eﬃcient quantity. This in turn depends on preferences —
for suﬃciently concave preferences it is not suﬃcient, while for preferences suﬃciently linear, prices
increase more than enough to buy the eﬃcient quantity. Thus, we have the following:
Corollary 3 With passive policy, dq/da > 0 for all a.
4.4 Optimal Stabilization
What is the optimal response of the central bank to these shocks? We assume the central bank’s
stabilization policy maximizes the welfare of the representative agent for a given steady-state in-
ﬂation rate. It does so by choosing the quantities consumed and produced in each state subject
to the constraint that the chosen quantities satisfy the conditions of a competitive equilibrium.
The policy is implemented by choosing the injections τ1 and τ2 accordingly. This is a standard
Ramsey problem. The growth rate of the money supply is determined exogenously to ﬁnance a
ﬁxed amount of government consumption in market 2. This implies γ>1.
It is straightforward to show that the expected lifetime utility of the representative agent at the
beginning of period t is given by
(1 − β)V (M−1)=U (x) − x − g +
Z
Ω
n[εu(q) − q/a]f (ω,ω−1)dω
where g is the real amount of government spending that is ﬁnanced in market 2. It is obvious that
x = x∗ so all that remains is to choose q = q(ω).
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where µ is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 when there are no banks and equal to 0 when
there are banks.
Suﬃcient conditions for a maximum are
n
£
aεu0 (q) − 1
¤
+ λ[n +( 1− n)µ]a2εu00 (q)=0 and (20)
aεu00 (q)u00 (q) −
£
aεu0 (q) − 1
¤
u000 (q) > 0 for all ω.
The second order condition is satisﬁed if either u000 (q) ≤ 0 or if u000 (q) > 0 and marginal utility is
log-concave.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the planner never chooses q = q∗ (ω) for any state. This is in
contrast to the decentralized equilibrium where q = q∗ (ω) for some range of all three shocks when
γ>β . The reason is that the planner attempts to smooth consumption across states whereas no
state contingent contracts are traded amongst the agents themselves. He does this by setting i>0.
Consequently, although i =0is the optimal policy for all states, unless it can be done for all states,
it is optimal to never set i =0 . Hence, zero nominal interest rates should be an all-or-nothing
policy.
The second thing to note is that while banks do aﬀect the level of consumption across states
that a planner chooses, the existence of banks does not aﬀect the ratios of consumption across














which is independent of µ. In short, the ﬁnancial system merely relaxes the constraint for the
planner but has no impact on how consumption is allocated across states.
We now want to characterize the planner’s choices across states. With respect to extensive
margin shocks we state the following:
Proposition 4 The constrained planner’s choice of quantities yields
dq
dn =0when there are no




u00 (q)[aεu0 (q) − 1]
naεu00 (q)u00 (q)+n[aεu0 (q) − 1]u000 (q)
≥ 0 (21)
13with banks (µ =1 ).
According to Proposition (4), without banks the planner chooses the same consumption in each
state which implies υn = υ. The reason is that although the central bank can alter q via its choice
of τ1, doing so would only create consumption variability which is welfare reducing. Consequently,
the best stabilization policy is to keep quantities constant across states. Note that this implies
aggregate consumption still varies across states.
In contrast, with banks the planners optimal choice of individual consumption is increasing in
n. Note also that this just the opposite from what happens when the central bank is passive. With
a passive policy, buyers consume more in low n states since loans are plentiful and cheap. However,
this is not optimal. From the viewpoint of the representative agent looking into the future, he
wants to consume more when he is more likely to desire consumption, which is when he is a buyer
(high n). However, these are the states when there is little liquidity in the banking system since
the number of depositors is low. Thus, what the planner would like to do is to increase liquidity
when aggregate demand is high and deposits are low and reduce it when aggregate demand is low
and deposits are high. To accomplish this, the central bank injects more cash into the system in
high n states and less cash in low n states. These transfers are chosen to generate the quantities
solving (20).
An interesting implication of this policy is that the central bank is essentially providing an
elastic supply of currency to the economy — when demand for liquidity is high, the central bank
provides additional currency and withdraws it when the demand for liquidity is low. Note what
this does NOT imply — a constant nominal interest rate across states, which would imply that
consumption is the same in all states.
With respect to intensive margin demand shocks we have:





ε{aεu00 (q)u00 (q) − [aεu0 (q) − 1]u000 (q)}
≥ 0 (22)
with or without banks.
Unlike the passive policy equilibrium, where dq/dε =0when q<q ∗ (ε), the planner wants
consumption to be increasing in ε. As before, when agents desire more consumption, it is optimal
to give them more. This is achieved by injecting more liquidity into the system to bring down
14nominal interest rates thereby allowing agents to buy more goods when it is so desired.10




u00 (q){εau0 (q)+2[ aεu0 (q) − 1]}
a2εu00 (q)u00 (q)+a[aεu0 (q) − 1]u000 (q)
≥ 0 (23)
with or without banks.
5 Optimal policy with persistence
For the rest of the paper we focus on shocks to the number of buyers and sellers since banks play a
key role in the propagation of these shocks. To analyze these shocks we begin with the case where





where nH >n L > 0. Assume that there are banks (µ =1 ) . Assume that
the shocks follow a stationary ﬁnite state ﬁrst-order Markov process, which is summarized in the





t πH 1 − πH
nL
t 1 − πL πL
where πj denotes the probability that state j follows state j, i 6= j. Accordingly, 1 − πj is the
probability that state i follows state j.W ea s s u m e
πH,πL ≥ 1/2 (24)
With strict inequality there is no persistence.
Conjecture a steady state equilibrium with two values for the real stock of money zH and zL.

































10Recall that the extra liquidity is withdrawn in market two.
15which is negatively associated with expected inﬂation γ. In our analysis we will focus on ξj rather
than γ since ξj is proportional to γ.
The Friedman rule We can write the two ﬁrst-order conditions (17) as follows
γ
β
zH = zHu0 ¡
qH¢











































Evidently, the ﬁrst-best allocation can be attained with a policy (the Friedman rule) that sets the
expected return on money 1
ξj equal to the real interest rate 1






zjπj + zi ¡
1 − πj¢
zj





zj > 1/β, the Friedman rule requires a positive average rate of inﬂation. Note that
the Friedman rule requires diﬀerent policies for the two states.
In order to derive the equilibrium away from the Friedman rule we have to distinguish between
two ranges for γ.W eﬁrst derive the equilibrium when the rate of inﬂation is high as made clear
below.
5.1.1 High γ
Assume γ is suﬃciently large so that the cash constraint binds in both states.



























are deﬁned in the proof.






























































Equation (30) deﬁnes a function zH = f
¡
zL¢
which is strictly increasing in zL ∈ ZL.W e c a n
therefore invert it to get zL = ˘ f
¡
zH¢







1 − πL − πH¢
≥ 0,t h e n
zH =0 .T h u szH =0for a strictly positive value of zL since
¡
1 − πL − πH¢
< 0.E q u a t i o n( 3 1 )
deﬁnes a function zL = g
¡
zH¢
which is strictly increasing in zH ∈ ZH. We can therefore invert
it to get zH = ˘ g
¡
zL¢







1 − πL − πH¢
=0 ,t h e nzL =0 .T h u s
zL =0for a strictly positive value of zH since
¡
1 − πL − πH¢
< 0.
Deﬁne ¯ zL =
nLq∗
υL and ¯ zH =
nHq∗
υH . Then, the properties of these functions imply that a monetary




































L z  
LL zz =
HH zz =  
H z  
()
L gz   
()
L fz  
Existence requires  ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( ).
LL HH gz fz gz fz ≤≥
 
() ()
LL fz gz ≥ 
() ()








are strictly increasing in zL ∈ ZL the equilibrium is unique if it exists.





υj and q∗ =1



































































Passive policy and Friedman rule Consider the special case of a passive policy where υH = υL
so ζ = nL
nH < 1 and πL = πH = π>1/2. I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v eqH <q L and zH >z L since
πH +πL ≥ 1.T h e ni fw ea r ei nt h eh i g hn state in period t , the economy is more likely to be in the
high demand state again tomorrow. Since agents are more likely to be buyers in period t+1,t h e r e
i sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e m a n df o rm o n e yi nm a r k e t2w h i c hi n c r e a s e sφH thereby increasing zH.I f
the state is nL in period t, then agents are more likely to be sellers next period, so the demand for
money falls causing zL to fall.





































2nH (1 − π)π + nLππ + nL (1 − π)(1− π)




2nH (1 − π)π + nL (1 − 2π(1 − π))



















(1 − π)π ≤
£





[2(1 − π)π − 1+π] ≤ 0

















nH (1 − π)+nLπ
¤
(1 − π)




2nL (1 − π)π + nHππ + nH (1 − 2π(1 − π))








[nL (1 − π)+nHπ]





This stabilizes consumption across states and requires a procyclical policy when n is high υ is
high. The question then is whether or not this is the optimal policy — would the planner choose
consumption smoothing? The answer is almost certainly no. The planner wants more consumption
in the high state and less in the low state just as before.
5.1.2 Low γ
Now suppose that agents are only constrained in state H or only constrained in state L.
Proposition 8 A monetary equilibrium where agents are constrained in state H and unconstrained


























are deﬁned in the proof.
A monetary equilibrium where agents are constrained in state L and unconstrained in state H exists














19Proof. If agents are only constrained in state H we have
qH =
υHzH
nH <q ∗ ≤
υLzL
nL












































1 − πL − πH¢¸
(37)
Equation (36) deﬁnes a function zH = f
¡
zL¢
w h i c hi ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nzL. We can therefore
invert it to get zL = ˘ f
¡
zH¢
. Furthermore we have zH =0if qL =0 . Equation (37) deﬁnes a
function zL = g
¡
zH¢
which is strictly increasing in zH ∈ ZH. We can therefore invert it to get
zH = ˘ g
¡
zL¢




1 − πL − πH¢
=0 ,w eh a v ezL =0 .T h u szL =0for
a strictly positive value of zH since
¡
1 − πL − πH¢
< 0.








































L gz   
()
L fz  
Existence requires  ( ) ( ) and  ( ) ( ).
LL HH gz fz gz fz ≥≥
 
() ()
LL gz fz ≥ 
() ()








are strictly increasing in zL the equilibrium is unique if it exists.
The proof when agents are constrained in state L only is similar and therefore omitted.
Logarithmic utility Assume agents are constrained in state H only. With log utility we have
qH =
υHzH
nH ≤ q∗ =1<
υLzL
nL









1 − πH − πL¢¤
γυH (γ − βπL)
(40)
For this equilibrium to exist we need
υHzH











πH + πL − 1
¢
≤ γ






















, (40) is an equilibrium.
5.2 k states
Now suppose there are k>2 shocks taking the value nj ∈ [n,n] with nj+1 >n j for all j. Continue

























υj πsj for s =1 ,2,..,k
Ordering these equations from the lowest value state to the highest value state gives us a system
of equations that can be written as
AZ = B















where I is a ˜ n−1 x ˜ n−1 identity matrix, ∅ is a k +1− ˜ n x ˜ n−1 matrix of zeros and P is a ˜ n−1
x k +1− ˜ n matrix whose ijth element is
β
γπij. Finally, T is a k +1− ˜ n x k +1− ˜ n matrix whose
oﬀ diagonal elements are
β





. Thus a steady state is
the solution to
Z = A−1B
Conditions need to be imposed that each z is positive. It then simply comes down to deriving
conditions such that
υizi
ni ≤ q∗ =1<
υjzj
nj
for i<˜ n and j ≥ ˜ n. This should give us conditions on the range of γ.
6C o n c l u s i o n
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Recall from (5) and (6) that Wm = φ and Wd = −Wl = φ(1 + id) ∀m2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
∂qs
∂m1 =0
because the quantity a seller produces is independent of his money holdings. We also know that
∂ds
















− φ(1 + i) ∂l
∂m1
i
+(1− n)φ[(1 + (1 − µ)i)]}f (ω|ω−1)dω







=0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,n o t et h a tN o t et h a t
εu0 (qb)
∂qb
∂m1 − φ(1 + i) ∂l
∂m1 = εu0 (qb)
∂qb















naεu0 (qb)+( 1− n)(1+(1− µ)i)
ª
f (ω|ω−1)dω
Deﬁne m∗ = pq∗ where q∗ = u0−1 (1/(aε)).T h e n i fm1 <m ∗, 0 <q b <q ∗,i m p l y i n g
∂qb
∂m1 > 0 so
that V 00(m1,ω−1) < 0.I f m1 ≥ m∗, qb = q∗ implying
∂qb
∂m1 =0 ,s ot h a tV 00(m1,ω−1)=0 .T h u s ,
V (m1,ω−1) is concave ∀m.¥
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof involves two steps. We ﬁrst show that for a given z ac r i t i c a l
value ˜ n exist such that if n<˜ n trades are eﬃcient and if n>˜ n they are ineﬃcient. We then show
that an unique z exist.
Step 1: Critical value ˜ n. In a steady-equilibrium m1 = M−1 so buyer’s money holdings satisfy
(1 + τ1)
³




M−1 = υθM (41)
where θ =1− µ + µ/n and υ =( 1 + τ1)/(1 + τ).N o t e t h a t θ =1if there are no banks and
θ =1 /n with banks. Thus, in any equilibrium pq ≤ υθM. Then, the seller’s ﬁrst-order condition
p =1 /φ implies that in any equilibrium q ≤ υθz.T h ee ﬃcient quantity is deﬁned to be u0 (q∗)=1 .
If trades are eﬃcient, q = q∗ ≤ υθz otherwise q = υθz < q∗. Consequently, there is a critical value
˜ n for which
˜ n =˜ n(z)=
µυz
q∗ − (1 − µ)υz
(42)
24Note that ∂˜ n
∂z ≥ 0. This implies that q = q∗ for n ≤ ˜ n and q = υθz for n>˜ n.






[n +( 1− n)µ]
£
u0 (q) − 1
¤
f (n)dn.
where q = qb (n).






[n +( 1− n)µ]
£
u0 (υθz) − 1
¤
f (n)dn ≡ RHS.
The right-hand side is a function of z only. For z → 0 we have
lim
z→0




[n +( 1− n)µ]
£
u0 (υθz) − 1
¤
f (n)dn = ∞.









Hence a monetary equilibrium exists.










So the the right-hand side is monotonically decreasing in z. Consequently, we have a unique z,
denoted z, such that
˜ n =
µυz
q∗ − (1 − µ)υz
and
q = q∗ if n ≤ ˜ n and q<q ∗ otherwise.
Note that if µ =0 , ˜ n =0so the ineﬃcient quantity is consumed for all n for γ>β .
Finally, recall that, due to idiosyncratic trade shocks and ﬁnancial transactions, money holdings
are heterogeneous after the ﬁrst market closes. Therefore, if we set m1 = M−1, the money holdings






sellers. Solving for equilibrium consumption and production in the second market, with x∗ =
U0−1 (1),gives
Trading history: Production in the last market:























is bounded. Since we assumed that the elasticity of utility e(q) is
bounded, we can scale U(x) such that there is a value x∗ = U0−1 (1) greater than the last term for
all q ∈ [0,q∗]. Hence, hs is positive for for all q ∈ [0,q∗] ensuring that the equilibrium exists.
Proof that banks lower aggregate consumption variability:
TO DO
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : In a steady state equilibrium the real value of money is constant so







εu0 (q) − 1
¤
dF (ε) (43)
In any equilibrium pq ≤ υθM. Then, the seller’s ﬁrst-order condition p =1 /φ implies
q ≤ υθz





Consequently, since - as we show below - z is strictly decreasing in γ, for a given distribution of
shocks, there exists a critical value for ε,d e n o t e s˜ ε such that if ε ≤ ˜ εq= q∗ (ε) and if ε>˜ ε then




Note that ˜ ε is decreasing in z and attains zero at z =0 .







εu0 (υθz) − 1
¤
dF (ε)
The right-hand side expression is monotonically decreasing in z. To see this note that
∂RHS
∂z






dF (ε) < 0
Thus there exists a unique value of z such that .......¥


















26In a steady state equilibrium the real value of money is constant so φM = φ−1M−1 = z.T h u s ,







au0 (q) − 1
¤
dF (a) (46)
In any equilibrium pq ≤ υθM. Then, the seller’s ﬁrst-order condition p = 1
aφ implies
q ≤ aυθz





There are two cases. Assume ﬁrst that R(q)=−qu00 (q)/u0 (q) ≥ 1 and that for a given distribution
of shocks, there exists a critical value for a, denotes ˜ a such that if a ≤ ˜ aq= q∗ (a) and if a>˜ a
then q<q ∗ (a). The critical value satisﬁes
˜ au0 (˜ aυθz)=1 .
Then R(q)=−qu00 (q)/u0 (q) ≥ 1 implies that d˜ a








au0 (aυθz) − 1
¤
dF (a)
The right-hand side is monotonically decreasing in z. To see this note that
∂RHS
∂z









dF (a) < 0
Consequently, there exists a unique value of z denoted by z such that ˜ a solves ˜ au0 (˜ aυθz)=1so
that if a ≤ ˜ aq= q∗ (ε) and if a>˜ a then q<q ∗ (a).
Assume next that R(q)=−qu00 (q)/u0 (q) < 1 and that for a given distribution of shocks, there
exists a critical value for a,d e n o t e s˜ a such that if a<˜ aq<q ∗ (ε) and if a ≥ ˜ a then q = q∗ (a).
The critical value satisﬁes
˜ au0 (˜ aυθz)=1 .
Then R(q)=−qu00 (q)/u0 (q) < 1 implies that d˜ a








au0 (aυθz) − 1
¤
dF (a)
27The right-hand side is monotonically increasing in z. To see this note that
∂RHS
∂z









dF (a) < 0
Consequently, there exists a unique value of z denoted by z such that ˜ a solves ˜ au0 (˜ aυθz)=1if
a<˜ aq<q ∗ (a) and if a ≥ ˜ a then q = q∗ (a).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :¥
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